This paper looks at the e¤ect of credit constraints on skill acquisition when agents have heterogeneous abilities and wealth. We use a general equilibrium model and assume credit markets are absent.
Introduction
What is the role of credit constraints in transferring skills across generations and what is the role of trade in this? What is the e¤ect of tighter credit constraints? Will tighter credit constraints reduce the extent of training and raise its price? Will welfare rise or fall and why? These are the questions addressed in this paper. They are clearly of immense relevance for policy since human capital is not good collateral for loans and the ability to acquire skills can be severely limited by wealth. In this paper we explicitly model the acquisition of skills by agents. We assume credit markets are absent, but consider two settings with di¤erent degrees of credit market imperfections. In the …rst one, credit markets are completely absent and the only way an agent can acquire skills is by paying for training in full up front. This is clearly an extreme case and in the second setting we allow credit constraints to be weakened through a pay as you go system. These can be interpreted as an apprenticeship contract where training is provided in exchange for services. Alternatively, they can be interpreted as a form of work study. For example, most Ph.D. students in the U.S. have their education paid for and obtain a stipend in return for teaching or research services. Many undergraduates …nance at least part of their education through work study programs. 1 An alternative way of acquiring skills is through …rms paying for it. There is a fairly large literature that models such contracts. It deals with issues such as which labor market imperfections would make …rms pay for general training that is transferable across …rms, the features of such contracts and their rationale, the ine¢ ciency of training levels provided by …rms, as well as the success of such apprenticeship programs in providing a skilled labor force. For example, Chang and Wang (1996) , Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) , and Malcomson et. al. (2003) analyze the e¤ects of asymmetric information between training …rms and other potential employers. Acemoglu (1997) , Booth and Chatterji (1998) consider the implications of imperfect competition in the skilled labor market. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) look at how wage compression can induce general training by …rms. All these papers have a worker's marginal productivity increasing with training by more than the wage the …rm pays. This enables the …rm to capture some returns to general training and, as a result, the …rm …nds it pro…table to invest in worker training. For a review of this research, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) and Smits and Stromback (2001) .
Such issues are not the subject of this paper. Rather, we focus on another, hitherto unstudied aspect of apprenticeships, namely their ability to help circumvent credit constraints. Those with the skills to impart (masters) enter into a contract with the unskilled (apprentices) to "teach as best they know"their technical skills. In return, the apprentice undertakes the tasks assigned to him by the master for the (speci…ed) period of his apprenticeship. He is paid below market wages during this period, receiving payment in the form of training instead. 2 Contrast this with the alternative where the training fees have to be paid up front. In the absence of credit markets, only those with the wealth to pay the up front fee could a¤ord training. Note however, that even if part of the fee is paid up front, as occurs when the apprentice's wage is negative, the less well o¤ may be able to a¤ord the apprenticeship (work study) route.
Are credit constraints important in the U.S. today and is there evidence that such ways of overcoming credit constraints are important in the U.S. today? It is well understood that inter-generational income correlation is reasonably high. 3 Empirical work on college attendance has consistently shown that parental income does predict college attendance and that the e¤ect on college attendance of tuition is greater for lower income families. Should this be taken as evidence of credit constraints? Recent work by Cameron and Heckman (1998) questions such an interpretation of these facts. They estimate decision rules for 2 Lane (1996) shows that in late 18th century, apprentices earned 41% of the journeyman (skilled) rate while unskilled workers earned 77%. In some cases, apprentices have even paid for the privilege of learning the trade. In fact, by the 18th century, an up front fee had become the norm. While there was considerable variation in the terms speci…ed between the country and the city as well as across occupations, there were instances of large sums, hundreds of pounds, being paid up front when the trade was particularly well rewarded. 3 Solon (1992) …nds a ballpark …gure of .4. Charles and Hurst (2003) …nd the pre-bequest correlation in log wealth to be .37.
college attendance that control for family background measures like parents education, family income at 16, and a measure of the child's skill endowment as proxied for by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). They …nd that family income is not signi…cant which they interpret as evidence that credit constraints are not binding. They argue that such correlations could arise in the absence of credit constraints at the college level: for example, parental wealth could be correlated to the skill endowment of the children 4 or school could have a consumption value so that higher parental incomes result in more education directly. Keane and Wolpin (2001) argue that credit constraints do matter. They estimate a structural model and argue that though borrowing constraints are tight, they are mitigated by agents adjusting labor supply. This is why changes in tuition a¤ect college attendance by relatively little, and have a greater e¤ect on poorer families who are likely to be more constrained by their labor supply. See Keane (2002) for a simple and clear summary of the issues here. Since most colleges today, other than the very elite (who go the straight aid route) o¤er work study to needy applicants, apprenticeships, broadly speaking, seem to have a signi…cant role in overcoming credit constraints in education.
There is a growing literature on education and the role of government in providing it in a dynamic setting. Most of this work works with one …nal good and focuses on the impact on income distribution. See, for example, the classic work of Becker and Tomes (1979 None of these analyze the static and dynamic e¤ects of skill formation. Moreover, they do not model the training sector explicitly and do not compare alternative training arrangements as we do. We develop a simple general equilibrium model where apprenticeships help overcome credit constraints that limit the ability of agents with heterogeneous abilities and wealth to acquire skills. There are two tradable …nal goods, and two factors, unskilled labor 5 There is a large literature on trade and human capital creation that builds on this paper which we shall neglect as our focus in on the role of credit constraints. 6 A similar result obtains in Eicher (1999) via a domestic credit market.
and skilled labor which is produced using skilled labor and unskilled labor. The unskilled labor intensive good is the numeraire and we allow the availability of skilled and unskilled labor in production to be endogenously determined.
In the static version of our model 7 , under either system of training, the response of supply to price depends on the number of skilled agents in the economy. If there are relatively few skilled agents, the normal supply response obtains. However, with many skilled agents, supply can be decreasing in price so that multiple equilibria may exist. The intuition is that in addition to the normal supply response, there is an induced Rybczynski e¤ect which could work in either direction. When there are relatively few skilled agents, an increase in the price of the skill intensive good raises the return to skilled labor and the cost of education. This reduces the number of agents who want to acquire training and thus raises the avilability of unskilled labor. The availability of skilled labor for production also rises as less skilled labor is needed in training. Whether relative availability of skilled labor rises or falls depends on the endowment of skilled workers to begin with: if this endowment is large, the relative availability of skilled labor falls, while if it is small, it rises. In the former case, relative supply of the skill intensive good can fall with price, while in the latter case it must rise.
Moreover, the relative supply of the skill intensive good can be higher or lower when credit constraints are relaxed! Again, relaxing credit constraints increases the number of agents who want to be educated at any given price. However, this reduces both the skilled and unskilled labor available for production. If the stock of skilled agents is large, then weaker credit constraints will raise the relative availability of skilled labor in production and hence shift out the relative supply of the skill intensive good. The opposite occurs when the stock of skilled agents is small. As a result, weaker credit constraints can result in a higher price of the skill intensive good contrary to what simple intuition might suggest.
8 7 In a static setting the stock of skilled labor is exogenously given as are expectations about future prices. 8 Simple general equilibrium intuition would suggest that weaker credit constraints would raise the availability of skilled labor shifting the relative supply of the skill intensive good a la Rybczynski, and lowering its relative price in autarky.
In steady state, however, non monotonicity of supply and multiplicity of equilibria occur only in the presence of credit constraints. An increase in the price in steady state raises the return to skilled labor today, and hence, the cost of education, but it also raises the return tomorrow. While the increase in the cost of education reduces the demand for training, the increase in the return tomorrow increases it. Since each agent must be able to train more than one worker for there to be skilled workers present in steady state, the latter e¤ect dominates. Thus, an increase in price raises the number of trainees, reducing the availability of unskilled workers for production. In steady state, and in the absence of credit constraints, as the number of trainees rises, so does the number of skilled workers available for production. As a result, an increase in price raises the relative supply of the skill intensive good. In the presence of credit constraints, relative supply need not be monotonic in price. For relative supply to be backward bending, the increase in education cost resulting from an increase in price must constrain enough of the potential pool of trainees.
In steady state, weaker credit constraints always raise the relative supply of the skill intensive good and lower its autarky relative price. Weaker credit constraints raise the demand for training, thus reducing the availability of unskilled labor in production. However, as the number of trainees rise, so does the availability of skillled labor for production and hence relative supply of the skill intensive good.
There may or may not be multiple equilibria in steady state with credit constraints: a key determinant is the distribution of wealth. We show that if there is limited substitutability in consumption, then a fall in the value of output of …nal goods under trade evaluated at trade prices must reduce welfare.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium in the single period under each system in isolation and together.
Section 4 looks at steady state equilibria and how they di¤er from the static equilibria in a closed economy. Section 5 studies how trade a¤ects outcomes. Section 6 provides concluding remarks and directions for future research.
The Model
There are two goods, X and Z, and one basic factor, unskilled labor, U , in the economy.
Unskilled labor can be transformed into its skilled counterpart, S. However, if K unskilled workers are taken on by a skilled worker then only G(K) units of the skilled worker's time remains available to him, where G(K) is a decreasing function of K. We assume that
so that A is the time required per trainee.
While good X; (the agricultural good and the numeraire), uses only unskilled labor in our calculated example, good Z uses both skilled and unskilled labor. All that is needed is that production of X and Z have di¤erent relative intensities and Z is relatively more skill-intensive than good X at all factor prices. We normalize units so that it takes one unit of unskilled labor to make a unit of the agricultural good and take it to be the numeraire.
Hence, p denotes the relative price of good Z. The production function for the industrial good is
We use an overlapping generations framework. There are L agents born in each period.
Each agent lives for two periods and is endowed with one unit of time in each period. An agent is characterized by two parameters: the probability of becoming skilled, or a master, upon undertaking the needed education, ; and his initial wealth, y. It is assumed that is distributed uniformly in the unit interval ( U [0; 1]) and y is distributed according
, where y max is the maximal wealth level.
In the …rst period of life an agent makes career choices. He could remain an unskilled worker, work in both periods at the unskilled wage, w. Alternatively, he could spend part of his time acquiring the skills that give him a chance at becoming a master and allowing him, if he so chooses and is successful in his training, to earn the skilled wage in the second period. Agents who try to become skilled but fail can work only as unskilled workers in the second period. Skilled workers could also choose to work as unskilled workers were it in their interests to do so.
We study two training systems. In the …rst, which we interpret as an apprenticeship system, where payment for training is not made up front, each skilled worker hires K
apprentices. An apprentice supplies A hours of his time to the master at a wage w A and spends 1 A of his time studying. 9 If a master takes on K apprentices he obtains A K units of unskilled labor at cost w A A K but has to spend AK hours of his own time in training them. In the second system, called the pay up front system, unskilled workers pay the master a fee, w C ; up-front. The training takes 1 C units of their time and they work for the remaining time as unskilled workers. 10 We assume that agents consume only at the end of their lifetimes and have identical
Cobb-Douglas preferences given by
where c X is the consumption of the agricultural good, c Z is the consumption of the industrial good, and b is bequests which are modelled as a "warm glow" from giving. In the early part of the paper we will neglect b, in e¤ect setting = 0 as we will keep the distribution of wealth …xed. Hence, optimal consumption of each good is a linear function of lifetime income, Y :
There are no credit markets, so agents cannot borrow. Hence, each agent has to …nance any up-front costs only from his wealth, which comes from bequests. When fees must be paid up front, agents with high ability but low initial wealth are barred from becoming skilled. In the apprenticeship system, credit constraints are less binding. In this manner we explore the implications of apprenticeship as a way of relaxing credit constraints in short-run and long-run settings. Next we set up the problems under the two systems. 9 The master may use all this time himself or sell it on the open market for w: We allow w A to be negative so as to allow for the possibility that being a master is so lucrative that workers are willing to pay for the privilege of being an apprentice. 10 If the training technologies in the two systems are the same then A = C = ; which will serve as our base case.
The Apprenticeship System
Since there are constant returns to scale, we can always think of the masters (skilled labor)
as running everything and interpret their returns as the earnings of skilled labor. 11 Each master chooses to hire unskilled labor and/or train unskilled workers, who, in return, work part of their time at below market wages and/or pay to be trained. Each apprentice spends 1 A of his time studying and works the rest of the time as an unskilled worker.
Unskilled workers are paid wage w t and apprentices are paid w A t , which may be positive or negative. If it is positive then we say that credit constraints do not operate as anyone who wishes to become an apprentice can do so. If w A t is negative then unskilled workers must pay masters. Only those who have su¢ cient initial wealth to do so have the option of becoming apprentices and we say that credit constraints operate.
In each period of time there are M t masters who are the successful trainees from the last period. Each master chooses how many apprentices to take on, K t , and how many unskilled workers to hire, u t , taking into account w A t ; w t ; and p t : Pro…ts are
It is convenient to transform the variables from u t and K t to U t and S t where u t + A K t = U t and S t = 1 AK t : Doing so and substituting in (1) yields the following pro…t-maximization problem
This expression has an intuitive interpretation. Thinks of a master as selling all his time on the market. A unit of master's time allows him to claim
) from training apprentices. Then he buys back the time, S t ; he needs to produce the good. Hence, the earnings of a master equal the value of output less the cost of hiring all the unskilled labor used, less the opportunity cost of his labor used in production, plus the value of his stock of skilled labor. 11 Increasing returns, when they occur, are external in their nature.
The …rst order conditions with respect to U t and S t are:
The marginal value product of an unskilled worker is equated to his wage. 12 Similarly, the value of an additional unit of skilled labor is equated to its opportunity cost.
Using (3) and (4) we get the demand for unskilled relative to skilled labor for each master to be equal to
Since product is exhausted due to constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the …rst three terms in (2) cancel so that the maximized value of pro…ts equals
Note that this is exactly the opportunity cost of the time a master is endowed with.
Had he chosen to just train workers, which he could do without facing diminishing returns, and sell the value of the time they o¤ered as payment at market prices this is exactly what he would have obtained.
The Pay Up Front System (PUF)
Trainees pay the master tuition, w c t ; and spend 1 C hours of their time learning skills.
In addition, they can work as unskilled workers C hours of their time and earn C w t :
A master hires unskilled labor directly and undertakes training of unskilled workers. His pro…ts are
12 Note that we do not have to worry about corner solutions since all inputs are essential in production.
In addition, note that the unskilled labor hired from the market can be negative: this just means that a master does not use all the apprentice labor he is entitled to, but sells it for w t per unit, while paying w
Again, it is convenient to substitute for G(K t ) = 1 AK t = S t in (7). Each master solves the following pro…t-maximization problem:
The …rst order conditions are:
Using (9) and (10) we get the demand for unskilled relative to skilled labor for each master to be
The maximized value of each master's pro…ts is his earnings. Think of the master selling all his skills as a trainer on the market, and buying back his use of S t and U t : Since there are constant returns to scale, product is exhausted, and the …rst three terms in (8) cancel so that the maximized value of pro…ts equals the opportunity cost of the time the master is endowed with
3 Autarky Equilibrium
Static Autarky Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the autarky equilibrium in each period t. First, we describe equilibrium under the apprenticeship system and then under the pay up front system.
Then we argue that if the two coexist, it is equivalent to having the apprentice system as it dominates.
The Apprenticeship System
An equilibrium in period t is characterized by a vector of prices p t ; w A t ; w t ; where p t is the price of the industrial good, w A t is the wage of the apprentice, and w t is the wage of unskilled worker. The proportion of agents who become apprentices is denoted by 1 ~ A t . Since both goods are essential in the consumption, both goods must be produced in autarky. Therefore, the wage of unskilled workers is equal to the price of the agricultural good, i.e., w t = 1. The equilibrium price, p t ; is determined from the condition
where c( ) is the unit cost function. The opportunity cost of a unit of skilled labor is
while the unskilled wage is unity. This pins down the price for a given w A t : Using the fact that the production function has the Cobb-Douglas form, we see
(1 )
Note that as price p t rises, so does A t which, in turn, implies that w A t falls. For a high enough price, w A t even turns negative so that workers must pay up front to become apprentices. Even under the apprenticeship system credit constraints become binding when p t is high enough, i.e., when
A A :
Occupational Choice A young agent in period t, with probability of being talented and inherited wealth y; has two options. The …rst is to work both periods of his life as unskilled worker. This gives a lifetime income of 2. The second option is to invest in skills hoping to become a master. In this case his …rst period income equals the apprentice's wage A w A t . In the second period, with probability he earns the master's pro…t, A t+1 , and with probability (1 ) he receives the wage of unskilled worker, w t = 1. 
where the second equality follows from (6).
Agents with a low probability of being talented, 2 0;~ A t ; work both periods of their life as unskilled workers, while agents with su¢ ciently high probability, 2 ~ A t ; 1 ; choose to become apprentices. As expected, higher pro…ts for masters today, i.e., lower wages for apprentices today, raise~ A t -fewer agents become apprentices. If the expected pro…ts of masters tomorrow rise, i.e., the expected apprentice's wage tomorrow falls, then~ A t falls and more agents become apprentices today. Thus
Equilibrium Since each agent spends a …xed share of his income on the consumption of each good, the relative demand for the industrial good is equal to
where X The derivation of supply of X and Z is slightly more complicated. Take expected pro…ts in the next period, E t A t+1 , and the cuto¤ level in the previous period,~ A t 1 ; as given. For a particular price, p t ; how do we get supply of the industrial and agricultural goods? Note that for each price, we get the return to skilled labor, From (5) we know the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor in Z; i.e., we know the input mix used in production of Z:
Therefore, the ratio of unskilled and skilled labor used in the production of the industrial good must lie on the ray O z P; which has slope equal to 1 A t ; and whose length is proportional to the supply of Z. Since only unskilled labor is needed in the production of agricultural good, the division of labor between the two goods is given by the intersection of O z P and O x A, which is the point P . Hence, the supply of good X is given by O x P .
More formally, using (3) we get the supply of good Z to be equal to
where M t is the number of masters in period t and L S Z = M t S t . Using this we get that the supply of good Z equals O z A multiplied by 1 A t
1
. Then, the relative supply
Hence, every price p t corresponds to a point on the relative supply curve as depicted in Figure 2 -moving p t traces out the relative supply curve.
In Figure 2 , price p 1 corresponds to
When price is below p 1 , the return to skilled labor is less than 1 (the wage of unskilled worker), as a result the option of working as unskilled worker is more pro…table than the option of being a master. For all prices below p 1 the supply of the industrial good, and hence the relative supply, is zero.
At price p 1 skilled workers are indi¤erent between two options so that relative supply is horizontal. Price p 2 corresponds to
and, as we can see from (6) ; to w A t = 0. For all prices below p 2 the apprentice's wage is positive, so credit constraints do not operate and the relative supply is denoted by RS ncc t . For prices above p 2 the apprentice's wage is negative, i.e., workers pay to become apprentices. In this event, agents are subject to credit constraints. Relative supply in this region is denoted by RS cc t . When price exceeds p 3 the apprentice's wage is so low that the option of investing in skills is dominated and there are no apprentices (~ A t = 1). Finally, at p 4 all unskilled labor is used in the production of the industrial good, the supply of the agricultural good is zero and the relative supply goes to in…nity.
Next, we turn to the shape of the relative supply curve and the nature of static equilibrium. An equilibrium in which the apprentice's wage is positive is a non-credit-constrained (NCC) equilibrium. An equilibrium in which the apprentice's wage is negative is a creditconstrained (CC) equilibrium. The static equilibrium could be credit-constrained or not. If there are enough masters, i.e.,
M t >M
A , then relative supply need not be increasing in price. Multiple equilibria are possible, but there is at most one non-credit-constrained equilibrium.
We relegate the formal proof to the Appendix and focus on the intuition behind this result here. Suppose that the price increases. This results in a higher return to skilled labor and in a lower apprentice's wage. 13 As a result, the input mix in production moves away from skilled labor. In a static setting, the fall in the apprentice's wage makes investing in skills less pro…table and~ A t increases. Hence, the supply of unskilled labor in period t rises. As fewer agents wish to be apprentices, masters spend less time training them and the supply of skilled labor available for production increases. Note that both skilled and unskilled labor available for production rise so that their relative availability may rise or fall.
The e¤ects on relative supply can be decomposed into two parts. First, the part due to change in the availability of skilled relative to unskilled labor for production purposes.
An increase in the relative skilled labor availability raises Z=X; the relative supply of the skilled labor intensive good, a la Rybczynski. A decrease in the relative skilled labor availability does the opposite. Second, the part due to factor price changes and hence input mix changes. An increase in p moves the input mix towards unskilled labor, the ray in Figure 3 moves from P 00 to P 0 : For given factor supplies, this raises the relative supply of the skill-intensive good. This is the basis of the usual positive supply response in general equilibrium.
In Figure 3 (a) both e¤ects raise relative supply of Z: When there are few masters, M t >M A ; then the supply of skilled labor is relatively small to begin with. As a result, any given increase in~ It is shown in the Appendix that when M t M A , relative demand curve can intersect the relative supply curve at most once: either in its non-credit-constrained part, or in its credit-constrained part. If M t >M A there may be multiple equilibria with at most one non-credit-constrained one. 14 Multiple equilibria in this static set-up arise from the interaction of credit constraints and prices. When price is low, so is the return to skilled labor. In this case, the apprentice's wage is high, there are no credit constraints and a large fraction of the population becomes apprentices. Since M t is large, despite this, there is a lot of skilled labor available for production and output is high. Since price is low, demand is high and this can be an equilibrium. On the other hand, if price is high, so is the return to skilled labor and for this, apprentice's wages are negative. Credit constraints operate and many agents cannot become apprentices. While this does free up some skilled labor for production, masters are abundant and there is an ample supply of unskilled workers.
Hence the relative supply of skilled workers is low, as is the relative supply of Z.
Note that not all static equilibria are consistent with steady state: for example, if the intersection occurred at prices above p 3 ,~ A t = 1 and nobody would invest in skills. If there are no masters in period t + 1, then the return to skilled labor would be in…nite which is not consistent with expectations or possible in steady state.
Comparative Statics What is the e¤ect of a decrease in expected pro…ts in period t + 1 on period t's equilibrium price? From (14) we can see that a decrease in the expected pro…t from becoming a master in the next period increases~ A t -fewer agents choose to become apprentices. This fall in the number of agents wishing to be apprentices results, as argued above, in an increase in the supply of skilled and unskilled labor. However, in contrast to the e¤ects of a price change, there is no change in the returns to skilled or unskilled labor and hence no e¤ect on the input mix. The e¤ect on relative supply depends only on whether the supply of unskilled labor increases relatively more or less than the supply of skilled labor.
In Figure 3 (a) the supply of skilled labor increases relatively more than the supply of skilled labor since M t <M A . As we can see at this given price the relative supply goes up:
So, the relative supply curve shifts out, resulting in a lower equilibrium price. From (13) we can see that as a result the return to skilled labor falls and apprentice's wage rises.
In Figure 3 (b) the opposite happens -a decrease in master's pro…t expected in next period results in a higher percentage increase in the supply of unskilled labor relative to that of skilled labor. As a result the relative supply decreases:
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As the relative supply curve shifts in, the equilibrium price in period t rises, resulting in higher return to skilled labor and lower apprentice's wage.
Lemma 1 summarizes these results.
Lemma 1
If there are few masters in period t, i.e., M t M A , then a decrease in expected earnings of a master in the subsequent period results in a lower equilibrium price in the current period, as well as a lower return to skilled labor and a higher apprentice's wage. If M t >M A ; then the opposite occurs. 
Pay Up Front System
An equilibrium in period t is characterized by a vector of prices p t ; w C t ; w t , where p t is the price of the industrial good, w C t is the tuition trainees pay to masters, and w t is the wage of unskilled worker. As shown below, agents with abilities above the cuto¤ level,~ C ;
choose to get trained, so that 1 ~ C t is the proportion of agents who become trainees.
As in the previous section, the wage of unskilled workers is equal to the price of the agricultural good, i.e., w t = 1.
15 It will become obvious that this lemma also holds for the PUF system.
Occupational Choice Let~ C t denote the ability of the agent who is indi¤erent between the two options: to work both periods as unskilled worker or to invest in skills hoping to become a master in the second period. The …rst option gives a total lifetime income of 2. If agent chooses the second option, then his …rst period income equals the wage of unskilled worker multiplied by C units of time less the tuition. In the second period, with probability he earns the master's pro…t, C t+1 , and with probability (1 ) he receives the wage of unskilled worker, w t = 1. The expected lifetime income in this case equals
where the second equality follows from (12).
Comparing (14) and (17) we can see that in both apprenticeship and pay up front systems the proportion of agents wanting to invest in skills is given by the same function.
As in the apprenticeship system, higher pro…t for masters today is associated with a lower payo¤ for trainees, whether through a reduction in the apprentice's wage or an increase in the cost of tuition, which raises~ C t -fewer agents become trainees. Similarly, if the expected pro…ts of masters tomorrow rise, then~ C t falls and more agents want to become trainees today. Thus, @~
Equilibrium As in the previous section, the relative demand is given by (15) . We can use the approach used in the analysis of the apprenticeship system to derive the relative supply here as well. It is easy to check that when there are few masters, the relative supply under the pay up front system is upward-sloping, but if the number of masters is large then the relative supply can be downward-sloping. Suppose that the training technologies are the same in the two systems: A = C = . 16 What can we say about the relative position of relative supply curves under the pay up front system and under the apprenticeship system? As before, from the condition that the price of the good Z equals cost, we get the master'pro…t corresponding to any price:
(1 ) C t
Then, from (17) we get~ C t . These~ C t and C t determine the available supply of skilled and unskilled labor in a way that is very similar to the apprenticeship system when agents are subject to credit constraints. For any price there is a common level of earnings for skilled labor, t , under both systems, and corresponding to this, an education cost -the tuition fee, w C t ; in the pay up front system or the implicit price of (1 w A t ) under the apprenticeship system. All of the education cost is paid up front in the PUF system, while only max 0; w A t is paid up front in the apprenticeship system, so that more is always paid up front under the PUF system. Hence, at any given p t (or, at any t corresponding to this price) a larger proportion of agents are credit-constrained under the PUF system:
At any given price p t ; both systems have the same cuto¤ level for ability. However, since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system, fewer agents actually become trainees, the rest of those who want to do so cannot and remain unskilled so that the supply of unskilled workers is larger at any given p under the PUF system. The smaller number of trainees under the PUF system requires less skilled labor to train them. As a result, the skilled labor available for production is also larger under the PUF system. What can we say 16 Note that in this caseM A =M C =M .
about relative availability? As before, when there are few masters the relative availability of skilled labor is higher under the PUF system, while when there are many masters the relative availability of skilled labor is lower under the PUF system. Hence, the e¤ect on relative supply follows from the relative factor availability under the two systems.
If there are few masters, M M ; then at any given p; the relative supply of the skill-intensive good is more than that under the apprenticeship system. If there are many masters, M >M ; it is less than that in the apprenticeship system. This is depicted in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) . In Figure 4 (a) the number of masters is small, and, as a result, the relative supply curves for both systems are upward-sloping. At any price below p 3 (so that the proportion of agents who invest in skills is positive) the relative supply curve under the PUF system is to the right of the relative supply curve under the apprenticeship system.
When price is above p 3 there are no agents who invest in skills and the two curves coincide.
Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium in each system, and the equilibrium price under the PUF system is lower than the equilibrium price under the apprenticeship system. Since the equilibrium price is lower under the PUF system, we cannot conclude that the tuition in the PUF system is higher than the full fee under the apprenticeship system.
In Figure 4 (b) the number of masters is large. The relative supply curve under the PUF system is to the left of the relative supply curve under the apprenticeship system. And, as a result, the equilibrium price in the PUF system is higher. Moreover, as the price is higher and so is the full fee and hence the up-front education fee under the PUF system. Proposition 3 summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 If the training technologies are the same in the two systems then at any given p; relative supply of the skill-intensive good is higher under the PUF system than that under the apprenticeship system as long as M M : As a result, the equilibrium price is lower than the equilibrium price under the apprenticeship system. If M >M ;
relative supply of the skill-intensive good is lower under the PUF system than that under the apprenticeship system. Consequently, the equilibrium price under the PUF system is higher than the equilibrium price under the apprenticeship system.
Coexistence of Both Systems
Next we argue that when both systems co-exist, the outcome is exacty what it would have been under the apprenticeship system so that we are not losing anything by studying the two in isolation. How can this be? Suppose both systems coexisted and the cuto¤ levels (the~ 0 s) for the two di¤ered. 17 Then as both marginal agents have the same payo¤ from not being educated and the same expected payo¤ from being skilled tomorrow
Since the high wealth agents have all the options open to the low wealth ones, the only possible di¤erence is that the wealthy have options that are not open to low wealth agents.
In other words, the full cost of education for the wealthy is less than that for the poor or
some wealthy agents can become trainees while less wealthy ones of the same ability cannot.
However, a skilled worker can teach under the PUF system or take apprentices. Since his maximized income under the former is w C t A and under the latter is
; all skilled agents will take apprentices and only the the apprentice system will exist.
Steady State Autarky Equilibrium
In this section we solve for autarky steady state equilibrium. First, we describe steady state equilibrium under the apprenticeship system, and then under the PUF system. 17 If they are the same, it is equivalent to the apprentice system.
Apprenticeship System
Steady state equilibrium is characterized by a vector of prices p; w A ; w ; where p is the price of the industrial good, w A is the wage of the apprentice, and w is the wage of unskilled worker. The proportion of agents who become apprentices is denoted by 1 ~ A .
As in the previous section the wage of unskilled workers is equal to the price of the agricultural good, i.e., w = 1.
Occupational Choice Let~
A denote the ability of the agent who is indi¤erent between the two options: to work both periods as unskilled worker or to invest in skills hoping to become a master in the second period. The …rst option gives a total lifetime income of 2: If agent chooses the second option, then his …rst period income equals the apprentice's wage rate A w A . In the second period, with probability he earns the master's pro…t, A , with probability (1 ) he receives the wage of unskilled worker, w = 1. The lifetime income in this case equals
Note that a higher return to skilled labor means a lower apprentice's wage w A , hence there is a trade-o¤ between a higher earnings tomorrow and a lower wage today. But since a fall in w A raises the earnings of a master in the next period by more than it reduces the wage of an apprentice in the current period, a higher A leads to a lower~ A : more agents become apprentices. Thus, @~
Note that the relationship between~ A and the return to skilled labor has the opposite sign from that in the static set-up. In steady state the return to the option of investing in skills is increasing in A as explained above. In the static set-up, the master's earnings expected in the next period are …xed and agents take into account only the apprentice's wage in the current period, and as a higher A t means a lower apprentice's wage, the return to the option of investing in skills is decreasing in A .
Note also that for low levels of pro…t ( Equilibrium As in the previous section, the relative demand equals
We can use the approach used in the static set-up to derive the relative supply here as well. Take any price p. From the condition that price equals cost for the industrial good we get the return to skilled labor, A :
(1 ) A Then, the level A uniquely determines~ A as is apparent from (18) . The cuto¤ level~ A and, in the credit constrained case, the level of the apprentice's wage, together determine the available supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Note the following di¤erence between steady state and static supply of skilled and unskilled labor. In static set-up the number of masters as well as the amount of unskilled labor from the previous period is exogenous, while in steady state these are not …xed but endogenous and determined by~ A .
Next, we can use the Rybczynski box to derive the supply of good X and good Z: As in the previous section every p gives A ; A ; X S and Z S . In other words, every p corresponds to a point on the relative supply curve as depicted in Figure 5 .
In Figure 5 1 denotes the return to skilled labor such that A = 1: Price p 1 corresponds to this 1 . For all prices below p 1 nobody invests in skills, so production of the industrial good is zero. Hence, relative supply is zero as well. Price p 2 corresponds to A = A A and, as in the static set-up, to w A = 0. For all prices below p 2 the apprentice's wage is positive, so that credit constraints are not binding and relative supply is denoted by RS ncc :
For prices above p 2 the apprentice's wage is negative, and agents are subject to credit constraints. Relative supply in this region is denoted by RS cc : Finally, at p 3 all unskilled labor is used in the production of the industrial good, the supply of the agricultural good is zero and relative supply goes to in…nity.
Next, we turn to the shape of the relative supply curve and the nature of steady state equilibrium. First, we prove that when credit constraints are not operating the relative supply curve is upward-sloping. Suppose that price rises. Then the return to skilled labor rises as well, and this results in lower~ A : more agents choose to invest in skills at a higher price. Since more agents become apprentices, the supply of unskilled labor falls. What can we say about the supply of skilled labor? Subtracting the skilled labor needed for training from the stock of masters gives the supply of skilled labor available for production:
is the number of masters and K = 1 ~ A is the number of apprentices. As price rises, the number of apprentices increases, as does the number of masters. The total e¤ect on the supply of skilled labor is positive -L S increases with the price since 18 : dL S dp = d~ A dp A ~ A > 0 18 Agents with < A will not invest in skills so that~ A > A:
Hence, a higher price leads to a higher supply of skilled labor available for production of good Z and a lower aggregate supply of unskilled labor.
What about the output of the skill-intensive good? The supply of the skill-intensive good is
Then, as L S and A both increase, we can conclude that the supply of good Z increases as well. Since the amount of unskilled labor used in the production of skill-intensive good
As the total available unskilled labor decreases and the amount of unskilled labor used in the production of good Z increases at this higher price, the amount of unskilled labor available for production of good X decreases; so that supply of the agricultural good falls. Thus, we can conclude that when credit constraints are not operating, relative supply is increasing in price.
When agents are subject to credit constraints, the e¤ects of an increase in price on the supply of unskilled and skilled labor are ambiguous and depend on the distribution of wealth. If a higher price results in unskilled labor becoming relatively more abundant, then the relative supply of the skill-intensive good may fall. If, for example, there are many agents who become credit-constrained at this higher price, then a large proportion of agents who invested in skills at lower price cannot a¤ord to do so. Hence, the supply of unskilled labor rises, and the supply of skilled labor available for production of good Z falls. As a result, the relative supply of good Z may be lower at this higher price. Thus, when credit constraints operate, the shape of the relative supply curve depends on the distribution of wealth and can be either upward-sloping or downward-sloping.
As relative supply need not be monotonic multiple steady state equilibria may arise.
When price is low, so is the return to skilled labor. In this case, the apprentice's wage is positive, credit constraints are not binding and a large fraction of the population become apprentices. There is a lot of skilled labor available for production and output is high. At this low price, demand is high and this can be an equilibrium. On the other hand, if price is high, so is the return to skilled labor and, as a result, apprentice's wage is negative.
Credit constraints operate and many agents cannot become apprentices. This results in a relatively small supply of skilled labor and an ample supply of unskilled workers. Hence the relative supply of skilled workers is low, as is the relative supply of the skill-intensive good.
Proposition 4 summarizes these results. 
PUF System
Steady state equilibrium is characterized by a vector of prices p; w C ; w ; where p is the price of the industrial good, w C is the tuition trainees pay to masters, and w is the wage of unskilled worker. The proportion of agents who become trainees is denoted by 1 ~ C .
As before, the wage of unskilled workers is equal to the price of the agricultural good.
Occupational Choice Let~ C denote the ability of the agent who is indi¤erent between the two options: to work both periods of his life as unskilled worker or get training. The …rst option gives a total lifetime income of 2: If the agent chooses the second option, then his lifetime income equals w
Comparing (18) and (19) we can see that in both apprenticeship and PUF systems the proportion of agents wanting to invest in skills in steady state is given by the same function. As in the apprenticeship system, a higher return to skilled labor decreases~ Cmore agents want to become trainees.
Equilibrium We can use the approach used in the analysis of steady state equilibrium under the apprenticeship system to derive the relative supply here as well. Since under the PUF system, credit constraints operate at all prices, we can conclude that the shape of the relative supply curve depends on the distribution of wealth and can be either upwardsloping or downward-sloping. There may or may not be multiple equilibria in steady state:
a key determinant again is the distribution of wealth.
Proposition 5 Under the PUF system credit constraints are always binding. Hence, steady state relative supply need not be increasing in price. Multiple steady state equilibria may exist.
Suppose that the two training technologies are the same:
we say about the relative position of steady state relative supply curves under the PUF system and under the apprenticeship system? At any given price, both systems have the same cuto¤ level of ability. However, since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system, fewer agents can become trainees, the rest of those who want to do so cannot, and remain unskilled so that the supply of unskilled workers is larger at any given price under the PUF system. The smaller number of agents acquiring skills under the PUF system results in a lower supply of skilled labor available for production in the steady state. As a result, at any price the supply of good Z relative to good X is lower under the PUF system. Figure 6 depicts relative supply curves in both system, where relative supply under the PUF system is denoted by RS C , relative supply under the apprenticeship system when credit constraints are not binding is denoted by RS Ancc and when credit constraints are binding by RS Acc . As depicted, relative supply curve under the PUF system is to the left of the relative supply curve under the apprenticeship system. And, as a result, the equilibrium price under the PUF system is higher. Moreover, as the price is higher, so is the full fee and hence the up-front education fee under the PUF system. This shift out in relative supply of the skill intensive good when a country has better credit markets, in combination with better credit markets raising the mean wealth, drives the result in Ranjan (2001) that at a given price, the country with better credit markets will export the skill intensive good.
Proposition 6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 If the two training technologies are the same, then at any given p; steady state relative supply is lower under the PUF system than that under the apprenticeship system. As a result, the steady state autarky equilibrium price is higher under the PUF system.
Note that although there can be multiple equilibria, the autarky steady state prices can be compared. Also, if technology is identical, the country with the weaker credit constraints (the one with the apprenticeship system) will export the skill intensive good. The price under trade must rise for the country with the apprenticeship system but could rise or fall for the country with the PUF system as the equilibrium could jump from a low (high) price one to a high (low) price one.
E¤ects of Trade
Having described the closed economy, we turn to the analysis of the e¤ects of opening the economy up to trade. First consider the welfare e¤ects of trade when the country is small and cannot a¤ect the world price of the industrial good, denoted by p T .
Suppose that the country opens up to trade in period t. From the condition that the price equals unit cost for the industrial good, the return to skilled labor is determined by the world price p T . Let T t+i denote the return to skilled labor in period t + i under trade. Then for all periods after opening up to trade, pro…ts are constant at level T ; where
Similarly, the cut-o¤ level, which depends on master's earnings in the current period and in the next period, is also …xed after …rst period at:
In period t the number of masters is inherited from the previous period. Hence, the output levels are determined by the number of masters as well as by the world price. In period t + 1, the number of masters equals
and depends only on p T ; so that the output levels in period t + 1 are determined only by the world price. Thus, we can conclude that starting from period t + 1 the relative price of the industrial good, the return to skilled labor, the education fee, and the cut-o¤ level are …xed, so that the economy is in steady state equilibrium. Then, for any given world price the relative supply is given by the corresponding point on the steady state relative supply curve constructed in Section 3.
Similarly, the point on the relative demand curve corresponding to the world price gives the relative demand for the industrial good in trade steady state equilibrium.
From Section 3 we know that when credit constraints operate, steady state relative supply need not be increasing in price and multiple equilibria may exist under either system.
As we show below, non-monotonicity of relative supply may result in trade equilibria where the country ends up importing the industrial good at world prices higher than its autarky price and, as a result, loses from opening up to trade.
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 7 . The relative supply is non-monotonic and there are two stable steady state autarky equilibria: E ; is high and supply is low. Suppose that initially the economy is in autarky equilibrium E A 1 : What happens when the country opens up to trade and faces the world price of the industrial good which is higher than its autarky price? As the price rises, the earnings of a master rise as well, so that the option of investing in skills becomes more attractive. As more agents decide to invest in skills, the up-front education fee goes up. Credit constraints become tighter and more agents are unable to a¤ord education. Consequently, the supply of the skilled labor decreases, resulting in lower output of the industrial good as well as lower relative supply, denoted by RS T . As the price goes up, the relative demand for the industrial good, denoted by RD T ; falls. If a signi…cant proportion of agents becomes credit constrained at this higher price, then the decrease in relative supply is considerable and exceeds the decrease in relative demand: opening up to trade allows only few rich agents to invest in skills and, as a result, the supply of the skill-intensive good falls dramatically and cannot satisfy domestic demand at this price. Thus, the country imports the industrial good even though the world price is higher than the autarky price! Since the country loses its comparative advantage in the industrial good and has to import this good at a higher price, the aggregate welfare can be lower with trade. Proof. Let e(P; u) be the usual expenditure function. Let p; Q; C; u denote the price, output and consumption vectors while u denotes utility. The superscripts A and T refer to the autarky and trade outcomes. Thus,
Thus,
If there is no substitution in consumption, the …rst inequality is an equality. Hence, if
By continuity, if substitution in consumption is small enough and (21) holds, u T < u A :
The outcome in Figure 7 is depicted in Figure 8 in a way that highlights the condition given above. The production possibility envelope in steady in the presence of credit constraints need not have the usual shape: it can be bowed in as depicted. 19 19 It must also lie inside the steady state PPF envelope (which has the usual bowed out shape as in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)) in the absence of credit constraints. This makes sense as credit constraints result in ine¢ cency: the wrong people are trained, which shifts production possibilities inwards.
Conclusions
In this paper we develop a model where apprenticeships help overcome credit constraints that limit the ability of agents with heterogeneous abilities and wealth to acquire skills. We show that in the static version of our model, under either system, the response of supply to price depends on the number of skilled agents in the economy. If there are relatively few skilled agents, the normal supply response obtains. However, with many skilled agents, supply can be decreasing in price so that multiple equilibria may exist. In steady state, however, such non monotonicity of supply and multiplicity of equilibrium obtains only in the presence of credit constraints. Since credit constraints are stricter in the PUF system, relative supply of the skill intensive good is always higher, at any given price, under the apprenticeship system. There may or may not be multiple equilibria in steady state: a key determinant is the distribution of wealth. Finally, we show that opening the economy to trade could easily reduce welfare.
What can we say about endogenizing the distribution of wealth in our model? First it is clear that in the absence of credit constraints there will be a non degenerate distribution of wealth in steady state. Intuitively one can see this as follows: suppose that we start out with no bequests. Then there will be only three levels of wealth to begin with corresponding to the bequest of the skilled, the unskilled and the unskilled who tried to become skilled.
But as each of this group could end up in each of the three above situations, there will be 3 2 wealth levels in the next iteration. In this manner, all wealth levels get …lled in. A better understanding of this distribution, how it changes if the skilled have access to better draws of talent than the unskilled, and its interaction with the general equilibrium of the system are among our plans for extending this paper.
Second, that in the presence of credit constraints, the wealth distribution will become degenerate if even the most talented of the the children of the unskilled cannot a¤ord to become skilled. In this event, being unskilled will be an absorbing state. With heterogeneous ability, and absolute credit constraints as we have, we need to have government provide the up front payments for some fraction of the most able poor to get a non degenerate distribution of wealth in steady state. A complete understanding of how such scholarships a¤ect equilibrium is the subject of future work.
Proof of Proposition 1. For a given price p t the return to skilled labor is determined from the condition that the price is equal to cost (13) : Then, for given expected pro…ts in the next period we get~ The supply of the agricultural good is equal to the total unskilled labor available less the total unskilled labor used by the masters. Thus
The aggregate supply of the industrial good is equal to
Using (3) it follows that
Then, relative supply equals
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to p t we get dRS t dp , then the percentage increases in the supply of skilled labor is more than that in the supply of unskilled labor and, as a result, the relative supply curve is upward-sloping.
We can rewrite the relative supply in the following way:
where Therefore, there exists at most one equilibrium of NCC-type. 
